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We suggest that one individual holds multiple degrees of belief about an outcome,
given the evidence. We then investigate the implications of such noisy probabilities
for a buyer and a seller of binary options and find the odds agreed upon to ensure
zero-expectation betting, differ from those consistent with the relative frequency of
outcomes. More precisely, the buyer and the seller agree to odds that are higher
(lower) than the reciprocal of their averaged unbiased probabilities when this average
indicates the outcome is more (less) likely to occur than chance. The favorite-longshot
bias thereby emerges to establish the foundation of an equitable market. As corollar-
ies, our work suggests the old-established way of revealing someone’s degree of belief
through wagers may be more problematic than previously thought, and implies that
betting markets cannot generally promise to support rational decisions.
JEL-codes: D81, D83, D84, D87.
PsycINFO classification: 2340.
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I. Introduction
Gambling, broadly defined, appears to characterize our lives (Ramsey, 1926;
Reichenbach, 1938; Brunswik, 1943; Savage, 1954): given bounded rationality
and time constraints, we choose among alternatives based on limited degrees
of belief and face the prospect of adverse outcomes as a consequence. Under
these conditions, we strive to reduce our surprise by gathering evidence for and
against alternatives while trying to manage the trade-off between decision speed
and accuracy. Economists have long recognized the importance of these twin
phenomena (Stigler, 1961; Arrow, 1973) and watched institutions emerge to
support the production and distribution of knowledge (Machlup, 1962). How-
ever, with modern technology, scholars are now taking deeper vantage points
and have discovered rivalling hierarchies of neurons in the brain, which support
alternative hypotheses, gather evidence towards these, and compete to decide
the choices we make (Shadlen and Newsome, 1996; Heekeren et al., 2008).
Neurons positioned upstream in these hierarchies modulate their firing rate
in proportion to the strength of evidence for their supported alternative, while
neurons downstream modulate their average firing rate as if accumulating the
evidence detected (Newsome et al., 1989; Britten et al., 1993). Moreover, the
response times of subjects are generally longer for weaker evidence and shorter
for stronger evidence, suggesting that part of the solution developed by the brain
works to balance the speed and accuracy of decisions by requiring neurons to
reach thresholds for activity, indicative of confidence (Roitman and Shadlen,
2002; Palmer et al., 2005).
What makes the stated discovery particularly fascinating is what it suggests.
It suggests the brain has evolved to perform something like sequential analysis,
(SA) invented independently by Turing to break Enigma during World War II,
and by Wald to determine if munitions were of a satisfactory quality to ship by
the US Army during the same conflict (Gold and Shadlen, 2002). This method
involves a direct mathematical relation between the weight of evidence for a
hypothesis and the probability of the hypothesis being correct (Good, 1985),
which suggests that science is starting to unravel how our brains update the
beliefs (Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti, 1937; Edwards et al., 1963) on which we
wager in the face of uncertainty (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Kiani et al., 2014).
In SA, new evidence and updated probabilities follow each other determin-
istically through Bayes’ factor in the string of samples. Moreover, different
sequences through the whole evidence ultimately lead to same posterior prob-
ability distribution. But in the neurophysiological counterpart, the coupling
between evidence and probability appears less constrained. The stylized phe-
nomenon of across-trial variability in choices by an individual presented with
the same evidence (Faisal et al., 2008; Pisauro et al., 2017; Ratcliff et al., 2016)
suggests that noise between the presented evidence and its internal representa-
tion by neurons makes the posterior probability distribution different from the
one produced by the precision of mathematics.
While SA computes one probability for each possible outcome, given the
sampled evidence, it would appear the neurophysiological counterpart produces
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not one probability for each possible outcome, but an entire distribution of
probabilities, given the same evidence. For example, while SA might ultimately
suggest a 60 percent probability of Boston Red Socks winning, multiple judg-
ments by the same individual are possible on the same evidence. Consequently,
were this individual to bet on the match, their appraisal of fair odds might cor-
respondingly vary, despite appearing definite at the moment of communication.
On the other hand, one might also argue that even SA can have this effect, since
there are many sequences through the whole evidence for and against alternative
hypotheses, and because the process of SA may be stopped as time runs out.
Whatever the case might be, however, our basic suggestion remains: subjective
probabilities are not only dependent on the evidence, but also on the method
by which we process that evidence, and that may add degrees of randomness to
degrees of beliefs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequence of noisy probabil-
ities for odds agreed between a buyer and a seller of binary options, that is to
say, between two gamblers defined in the way most commonly understood. Our
predictions suggest that noisy, but unbiased probabilities, compel these gam-
blers to drive a wedge between the odds that are consistent with the relative
frequencies of possible outcomes, and the odds that are consistent with zero-
expectation bets. In particular, the buyer and the seller must agree to odds
that are higher than the reciprocal of their averaged unbiased beliefs when
this average indicates the outcome is more plausible than chance, and agree to
odds that are lower than the reciprocal of their averaged unbiased beliefs when
this average indicates the outcome is less plausible than chance. The gamblers
must do this in order to cancel an unfairness towards the seller in odds greater
than two, and cancel an unfairness towards the buyer in odds smaller than two,
which exists when probabilities are noisy, and gamblers place equal weight on
their respective beliefs.
Our predictions have, therefore, several important implications for economics.
First, they suggest the definition of fair odds must account for the level of noise
in probabilities held by each side of the market. Second, our predictions ex-
plain the favorite-longshot bias without involving preferences for risk among
individual gamblers (Friedman and Savage, 1952), without involving misrepre-
sentations of probabilities by individuals (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and
without involving asymmetric information between them (Shin, 1991). Instead,
our predictions suggest the favorite-longshot bias is an equilibrium outcome
that establishes the foundation of a fair market. Third, our work suggests noisy
probabilities make the old-established way of revealing degrees of belief through
wagering more difficult than previously thought (Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti,
1937; Carnap, 1962; Edwards et al., 1963), which, finally, casts doubt on the
promise of betting markets to provide unbiased indicators of future events and
support rational economic behavior (Arrow et al., 2008).
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II. The Basic Game
Sunday has come around again, and you are at the match once more with
your friends. You have read the latest news on both teams, and from what you
can gather, your probability of the home team winning is fifty-fifty. You have
no reason to think any of your friends are less informed than you, and still, you
cannot wait to continue the betting scheme you have been following for some
time with success. This week, Bob is your unwitting target.
“Hey Bob,” you say as you nudge him in the ribs with your elbow. “I
have an excellent proposition for you. Do you see this small box? It contains
my probability of our team winning today. What I want you to do is state
your probability to me, open the box, and look at what I have written. Then
we calculate the simple average of our two numbers and wager at the odds it
implies. Our probabilities will also decide which side of the market each of us
takes. If your probability is greater than mine, you back our team and take the
role of buyer, while I become your bookmaker and take the role of the seller;
otherwise, you take that role. I propose we stake one dollar. What do you say?”
Bob nods. “Sure, why not?”
“Excellent, but there is a final condition to my proposal. Once we see the
odds and know which side of the market we have, we are free to abandon.”
To Bob, your proposition sounds unproblematic, except for the last condi-
tion, which made him think. Given the match program sticking out of your top
pocket, he knows you have read the latest news, but so has he, which should rule
out the problem of asymmetric information. Moreover, the lecture in statistics
covering the classic thought experiment by De Finetti (1937) on how to reveal
someone’s degree of belief wasn’t one that Bob missed, and to him, your ar-
rangement seems close to that setting. Except there was no sealed probability
in De Finetti’s story, or perhaps there was, but it remained sealed and dis-
counted completely. Moreover, taking the average of beliefs across the market
is intuitively fair to Bob, and agrees with what he knows about the wisdom
of crowds (Galton, 1907), which has been said to characterize betting markets
(Arrow et al., 2008). Since you and he will be forming a small market, this
argument comforts Bob. As for the abandon clause, he cannot see its effect and
even finds it mildly insulting; Bob might be an economics student, but he can
certainly afford to lose a few multiples of a dollar!
“Right, you’re on! Bob exclaims. My probability is 0.3”.
“Splendid, Bob,” you reply and request that Bob now opens the small box.
“As you see, my probability is 0.5, and our consensus is therefore 0.4, which
means the odds we agree are one over 0.4, or 2.5. Also, since my probability is
higher than yours, I back our team, and you offer the odds as my bookmaker.
So, to be clear, if our team loses, I will give you $1 dollar, and otherwise, you
give me $1.50. Does that sound fair to you, Bob?”
“Yes, it does. And I am not bailing out!”
“Me neither, Bob, me neither.”
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III. Modelling the basic game
Let us model the basic game by first considering two independent mecha-
nisms that produce probabilities of mutually exclusive binary outcomes. In other
words, let us consider two independent mechanisms that estimate the relative
frequency by which independent binary outcomes would occur if events could
be repeated endlessly at constant initial conditions. Both mechanisms function
by sequentially detecting and accumulating evidence (Good, 1985; Gold and
Shadlen, 2002, 2007) for and against the competing hypotheses, h1 and h0, be-
fore converting the evidence to pairs of numbers on the unit interval. Formally,
we assume each mechanism uses the weight of evidence to generate probabili-
ties Ph1 and Ph0 of the respective hypotheses being correct (Gold and Shadlen,
2002)
(1) Ph1 =
1
10−WOEh1 + 1
, Ph0 = 1− Ph1 ,
where the weight of evidence gathered WOEh1 is expressed in bans following the
convention used by Turing (Good, 1985). Note from probability equation (1)
that since evidence for one hypothesis is evidence against its alternative, the
sum of any probability pair never fails to equal one, and as such, no opponent
can ever establish a Dutch Book against either mechanism.
IV. The Baseline Solution
Let us now assume two players of the basic game use the stated mechanisms
to form degrees of belief about the binary outcomes. We also assume the players
have utility functions that are linear with money, have no market power, and
wager only when their subjective expected margin (piBs in the role of the buyer,
and piSs in the role of the seller) is non-negative.
In the baseline solution, which we derive for regular comparison, probabilities
are noiseless and odds 1PC are found by equating the subjective expected margin
on each side of the market
(2) piBs =
(
1
PC
− 1
)
PB − (1− PB)
and
(3) piSs = (1− PS)−
(
1
PC
− 1
)
PS ,
to yield the consensus
(4) PC =
1
2
(PB + PS) .
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We notice solution (4) corresponds to the pricing rule in the basic game, but
there are a few other things to notice too. First, solution (4) provides market
observers with an unbiased estimate of the relative frequency PT observable if
events could be repeated endlessly at constant initial conditions. Second, the
solution is more reliable than PB and PS individually and thereby harnesses the
wisdom of crowds, precisely as Bob noted, and finally, since solution (4) places
equal weight on the beliefs, it seems fair.
Nevertheless, as we demonstrate below, when two players with noisy proba-
bilities play the basic game repeatedly, they will sooner or later find it unfair;
although both players would break-even across all wagers eventually, their mar-
gin in the role of buyer would be positive while their margin in the role of seller
would be negative. Accordingly, we notice the abandon clause in the basic game
serves to offer protection against negative expectation bets for the seller.
Introducing Noisy Probabilities
Let us be specific about the nature of stochasticity in the evidence accumula-
tion process, and then examine why the basic game becomes unfair. We assume
probabilities are produced uniformly across the appropriate range 0 ≤ PT ≤ 1,
thereby making things as simple as possible while maintaining the assumption
that PB and PS are unbiased estimates of PT . Accordingly, the continuous
uniform distribution
(5) PB , PS ∼ U(L,H),
describes PB and PS , where L = PT −E, H = PT +E, E =  ·min(1−PT , PT )
and 0 ≤  ≤ 1 (Figure 1). As such,  is a tunable parameter that can be used
to set noise to the maximum level governed by the range between L and H
(i.e.,  = 1), eliminate noise completely (i.e.,  = 0), adjust noise to somewhere
in between, while ensuring probabilities stay within their required limits and
remain an unbiased estimate of PT .
Given these assumptions, we can now state how the gathered weight of
evidence must couple to the whole evidence WOET , without needing to model
the accumulation process explicitly. Rearranging equation (1) to obtain the
equation for weight of evidence as a function of probability, we first obtain
(6) WOEh1 = −
log
(
1−Ph1
Ph1
)
log(10)
, Ph1 ∼ U(L,H)
Next, denoting
(7) a = ln
(
1
H
− 1
)
+ Ph1 ln(10),
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The Assumed Character of Noise:
0.05 0.5 0.95
PT
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
L, H
Figure I: For each magnitude of relative frequency PT (i.e., the objective
probability), the buyer’s probabilities PB and the seller’s probabilities PS (i.e.,
their degrees of belief about PT ) are produced uniformly and without bias.
How noisy the probabilities are is determined by what proportion  of the
uniform range around PT from L to H the probabilities are drawn from. The
thick red lines indicate  = 0.50, while the thick blue lines show  = 1, at
PT = 0.05, PT = 0.50, and PT = 0.95 respectively.
and
(8) b = ln
(
1
L
− 1
)
+ Ph1 ln(10),
we find the gamblers gather WOEh1 described (Figure 2, left) by the cumulative
distribution function
(9) F (Ph1) =

0 : L > 0 ∧ a > 0
10
Ph1(
10
Ph1 +1
)
(H−L)
: L = 0 ∧ a ≤ 0
H
H−L : L = 0 ∧ a > 0
1−2L+tanh( 12Ph1 ln(10))
2(H−L) : L > 0 ∧ a ≤ 0 ∧ b > 0
1 : Otherwise,
whose corresponding probability density function,
(10) f(Ph1) =
10Ph1 ln(10)(
10Ph1 + 1
)2
(H − L)
,
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has a median corresponding to probability equation (1) (Figure 2, right). Ac-
cordingly, we surmise the evidence accumulation mechanisms produce unbiased
estimates of PT because they tend to gather the whole evidence, albeit unreli-
ably.
V. The Unfairness of the Basic Game
The basic game is fair when players gather the whole evidence faultlessly,
but not when they gather evidence unreliably. Given the zero-sum nature of
the basic game, we can show this simply by focusing on the role of the seller.
Keeping things general by assigning the weight wS to the seller’s probability
and wB = 1 − wS to the buyer’s probability, we begin by stating the seller’s
expected margin as
(11) piSo = (1− PT )− PT
(
1
PB (1− wS) + PSwS − 1
)
and then condition it on the role allocation rule PS < PB , before computing the
mean of (11) across this subset of transactions. Denoting
c = −PT (1− )(12)
d = −PT (+ 1)(13)
g = 2PT (14)
h = w1(g − 2) + − c,(15)
and applying the stated condition, we find the mean of the seller’s expected
margin splits at the point of chance along the spectrum of PT , which we show
using subscripts 1 and 2 in
(16) p¯iSo1 = 1 +
c ln
(
c
d+gw1
)
1−w1 +
d(ln(d)−ln(d+gw1))
w1
g
for 0 ≤ PT < 12 , and
(17) p¯iSo2 = 1 +
(d+)(ln(−(d+))−ln(h))
1−w1 −
(−c)(ln(−c)−ln(h))
w1
g
(
− 4g + 1P 2T + 1
)
for 12 ≤ PT ≤ 1.
Equation (16) reveals that when players set odds using the arithmetic average
of their probabilities (solution (4)), and then gamble indiscriminately at these
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The Implied Character of Evidence Accumulation:
Figure II: Left: The given stimulus condition is characterized by the whole
weight of evidence WOET . However, we deduce the weight of evidence
gathered from must be distributed according to the CDF of equation (9) for
our assumptions about PB and PS to hold. We show the cases
(WOET = −1.28, PT = 0.05), (WOET = 0, PT = 0.50) and
(WOET = 1.28, PT = 0.95) in continuation of Figure 1. Right: The relation
between noisy evidence accumulation and noisy probabilities is shown
explicitly using equation (1). As in Figure I, the red lines concern  = 0.5
while blue lines show  = 1
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odds, they create a situation where the seller eventually realizes a negative
margin for all values of PT except PT = 1 (limPT→1 p¯iSoB = 0), and for all
values of noise except  = 0 (lim→0 p¯iSo1 = 0, lim→0 p¯iSo2 = 0).
At the special point w1 =
1
2 ,  = 1, and PT approaching
1
2 , the value of p¯iSo2
is ln(1−w1)w1 + 1 or −0.39. But more generally, p¯iSo1 is negative for 0 <  ≤ 1
when w1 =
1
2 , and indeed any 0 < w1 < 1. These predictions can be appreciated
visually from the horizontal line’s upward movement in the top and middle rows
of Figure 3 as noise decreases. As for the range 12 ≤ PT ≤ 1 captured by equation
(17), whatever value p¯iSo2 takes at PT =
1
2 , the same margin will eventually be
earned across the entire range 0 ≤ PT ≤ 12 , since
∂p¯iSo1
∂PT
= 0 in that interval.
Moreover, with any 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ w1 ≤ 12 , the value of p¯iSo2 approaches but
never enters the positive region, as PT rises above PT =
1
2 towards 1. However,
with enough weight placed on the buyer’s belief, 12 < w1 ≤ 1, the seller secures
a positive margin over the range 12 < PT < 1.
In short, when players have noisy probabilities, set odds using solution (4),
and gamble indiscriminately at these odds, they should trigger the abandon-
clause when given the role of seller, which means the basic game ends when
both players reach this conclusion.
The Origin of Unfairness
At the origin of unfairness towards the role of seller is an asymmetry between
the cost for the seller of PC underestimating PT , compared to the benefit of
PC overestimating PT by the same magnitude. To see this, let us define ι as
|PT −PC |, such that PC = PT +ι is beneficial for the seller, whereas PC = PT −ι
is costly. The seller’s margin in the beneficial case is consequently given by
(1− PT )− PT
(
1
PT+ι
− 1
)
, whereas the seller’s margin in the costly instance is
given by (1− PT )−PT
(
1
PT−ι − 1
)
. Subtracting the latter from the former now
reveals the asymmetry
(18) ∆ = − 2ιPT
ι2 − P 2T
,
which never enters the positive region, since ι must be smaller or equal to PT
in order for PC = PT − ι to remain non-negative.
Making the Basic Game Fair
In order for gambling to continue, the buyer must compensate the seller
for ∆, and we find it reasonable to think players of the basic game will seek
alternatives to solution (4) as they begin to sense ∆ through their financial
performance. In the following, we examine two candidate amendments to the
basic game and predict that only the second is feasible.
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The Unfairness of the Basic Game:
wS = 1: ϵ = 1, ϵ = 0.5
0.5 1
PT
-10
πSo
0.5 1
PT
-10
πSo
wS = 0.5: ϵ = 1, ϵ = 0.5
0.5 1
PT
-0.5
0.5
πSo
0.5 1
PT
-0.5
0.5
πSo
wS = 0: ϵ = 1, ϵ = 0.5
0.5 1
PT
-0.25
0.25
πSo
0.5 1
PT
-0.25
0.25
πS
Figure III: When the buyer and the seller agree to odds by placing equal
weight on their respective probabilities, as described by (4) in the basic game,
then an economic asymmetry between them arises. For 0 <  ≤ 1 and
0 < PT < 1, the mean expected margin for the seller from gambling
indiscriminately at the agreed odds is negative, while the corresponding value
for the buyer is positive due to the zero-sum nature of the basic game. In
short, in the basic game, the buyer and the seller are predicted to have
symmetric economic conditions only when probabilities are noiseless.
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Candidate A: Unequally Weighted Beliefs
Since the equal weight on beliefs required by solution (4) becomes unfair
when probabilities are noisy, it seems natural to presume that players of the
basic game will begin to converge on odds that place most weight on the belief
held by the buyer. In other words, for each relative frequency the buyer and
seller will set w1 such that odds
1
PC
makes neither part worse off when accepting
these odds indiscriminately. Unfortunately, no symbolic solution exists for this
attempt, but as illustrated by the left column of Figure 4, the numeric value
of w1 that yields p¯iSo1 = 0 and p¯iSo2 = 0 for different settings of PT and  is
available. We denote this weight by w∗1 .
When the buyer and the seller have increasingly noisy degrees of belief about
PT , then w
∗
1 decreases for all 0 ≤ PT < 1, thereby creating consensus odds that
are smaller than 1PT on that range. Moreover, the difference between
1
PC
and
1
PT
is greater for PT <
1
2 (Figure 4, right bottom). Unfortunately, while players
would discover they can achieve break-even if they remain in agreement to
gamble indiscriminately at odds determined by w∗1 , this agreement cannot be
sustained since indiscriminate gambling at odds determined by w∗1 is suboptimal
behaviour.
Candidate B: Fair Odds for Noisy Probabilities
Suppose you have tried to keep secret your invitations to play the basic game,
but now find Bob on your trail. He has approached each of your other friends and
asked about submitted probabilities, what probabilities were yours, and at what
point you decided to abandon the game. Looking at the numbers, your strategy
to quit the basic game whenever you have the role of the bookmaker becomes
clear, and Bob notices just how well you have done overall; although you have
lost bets, you are so far ahead that Bob must seriously consider that you have
discovered some kind of edge. At first, Bob merely decides he will congratulate
you in public and thereby reveal your strategy. But then he starts looking at
the numbers more closely and sees what appears to be a flaw in your behavior.
While you were right to follow through on wagers whenever probabilities gave
you the role of buyer - on the condition that odds were higher than two - you
would have made more money if you abandoned the game whenever the odds
were smaller than two. On the flip side, that means you were wrong to leave the
game in the role of the bookmaker whenever odds were lower than two. Armed
with this new insight, Bob draws up a simple 2 x 2 decision matrix (Figure 5)
and heads toward the stadium. He hopes you will agree to his new terms, but
not understand their importance and proceed as before.
What Bob has discovered is a crucial effect of noisy probabilities. PS and
PB are distributed uniformly for a given magnitude of PT , and PC consequently
follows a triangular distribution with upper and lower limits given by H and L
respectively, and with a mode given by solution (4). But the corollary is that
PT is distributed too, for each value of PC except the extremes. We can find
the exact distribution of PT by assembling all the triangular distributions of PC
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Candidate Solution A: Unequal Weighting of Beliefs:
ϵ = 0
0.5 1
PT
0.5
1
w1
*
0.5 1
PT
0.5
1
PC
0.5 1
PT
2
10
Odds
ϵ = 0.75
0.5 1
PT
0.5
1
w1
*
0.5 1
PT
0.5
1
PC
0.5 1
PT
2
10
Odds
ϵ = 1
0.5 1
PT
0.5
1
w1
*
0.5 1
PT
0.5
1
PC
0.5 1
PT
2
10
Odds
Figure IV: The economic asymmetry that occurs between the buyer and the
seller when they gamble indiscriminately at odds determined by an equal
weighting of their noisy probabilities appears naturally countered and
corrected by weighing their probabilities unequally. Specifically, the weight w∗1
placed on the seller’s probability across different relative frequencies PT (left)
should generally be diminished, particularly for magnitudes of PT at the point
of chance or below. Indeed, in the extreme case of  = 1, all weight should be
laced on the buyer’s probability. Only when  = 0 or PT = 1 does the rule of
equal weight provide symmetric economic conditions. If the market converges
on this amendment to the basic game, then the predicted consequence would
be odds that undervalue the chance occurrence and the longshot, but values
the favorite broadly in line with PT . We predict the market will reject this
solution, however, because wagers that discriminate between odds under this
solution have positive expectations.
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Optimal Strategies for Players in the Basic Game:
1
PC
> 2.00 1PC < 2.00
Buyer Bet Abandon
Seller Abandon Bet
Figure V: When probabilities are noisy, and PT is distributed for a given
magnitude of PC , the seller can profit against an unwitting buyer by accepting
wagers that have odds smaller than two, and rejecting bets that have odds
greater than two. Conversely, the buyer can profit against an unwitting seller
from wagering at odds greater than two and rejecting to wager at odds lower
than two. Accordingly, the basic game must eventually come to an end unless
gamblers agree to drive a wedge between the odds that are consistent with the
relative frequencies of possible outcomes and the odds that are consistent with
zero-expectation wagers.
across the interval 0 ≤ PT ≤ 1, and slicing, so to speak, the derived structure at
the particular magnitude of PC in focus (Figure 6). Performing this procedure
(see Appendix I) yields the probability density function
(19) f(PT ) =

(−1)PT+PC
2P 2T
: PC ≤ PT ≤ PC1−
(+1)PT−PC
2P 2T
: PC+1 ≤ PT ≤ PC
0 : Otherwise.
for 2PT < , and
(20) f(PT ) =

−(+1)PT+PC
2(PT−1)2 : PC ≤ PT ≤ PC++1
+(1−)PT−PC
2(PT−1)2 :
−PC
−1 ≤ PT ≤ PC
0 : Otherwise.
for 2PT ≥ .
Now, to answer if the seller’s profit varies from negative to positive across
the spectrum of 1PC , as Bob suspects it does, we must calculate the mean of
the seller’s expected margin at particular values of PC , when PT is distributed
according to f(PT ). In doing so, however, we prepare for our final and most
important point by introducing the constant m to capture by how much PC
must increase or decrease at each magnitude of PC to yield zero-expectation
bets across the entire spectrum, and thereby keep the game alive.
Appendix I contains the precise mathematical expressions of p¯iSo under dif-
13
The Distribution of PT for Values of PC :
Figure VI: The reason why the economic asymmetry in the basic game
cannot simply be countered and corrected by giving different weight to
different beliefs is due to another effect of noisy probabilities. Specifically,
when PB and PS are distributed around a particular magnitude of PT , then
PT is distributed around a particular magnitude of PC . Here we show the
cases  = 1 (left) and  = 0.5, for PC = 0.05, PC = 0.5, and PC = 0.95. As a
consequence of PT being distributed around PC , one observed magnitude of
odds (i.e., 1PC ) will be associated with many different unobserved magnitudes
of PT , which creates profit opportunities for the buyer and the seller across
different regions of odds.
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ferent settings of  and PC , while the left side of Figure 7 visually confirms
what Bob guessed: for values of 1PC < 2, the seller’s mean expected margin is
indeed positive, while for values of 1PC > 2, the seller’s mean expected margin
is negative.
Thus, although someone might agree to Bob’s new terms initially, they would
find their bankroll dwindle if only Bob applied the change, and given that real-
ization, they would stop participating.
For the game to continue indefinitely, what is required is an understanding
between players that odds for the favorite ( 1PC > 2) must be increased above
those given by solution (4), while they must decrease for the underdog ( 1PC < 2).
By how much PC must be increased or decreased to keep the game alive is found
by first setting p¯iSo to zero and solving the derived equations for m. Appendix
I shows these details mathematically, while Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate
them visually. In short, gambling based on noisy probabilities is predicted to
cause an adjustment to the basic game whereby odds undervalue the favorite,
and overvalue the long shot; although misaligned with the relative frequency of
outcomes at the limit, the odds are now fair given the level of noise.
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Candidate Solution B: Fair Odds for Noisy Probabilities:
ϵ = 0
0.5 1
PC
-0.5
0.25
πSo
0.5 1
PC
-0.1
0.1
m
ϵ = 0.50
0.5 1
PC
-0.5
0.25
πSo
0.5 1
PC
-0.1
0.1
m
ϵ = 1
0.5 1
PC
-0.5
0.25
πSo
0.5 1
PC
-0.1
0.1
m
Figure VII: Since the seller loses money in the basic game by wagering at
odds greater than two, and the buyer loses cash by wagering at odds smaller
than two (left), players must reduce odds for unlikely events (i.e., m must be
added to PC for PC < 0.5), and increase odds for likely events (m must be
deducted from PC) to make odds fair. As illustrated on the right, the amount
by which values of PC below 0.5 must be increased corresponds precisely to the
amount by which the corresponding magnitude at 1− PC must be decreased,
thus keeping the sum of PC ’s for the same binary option equal to one. Odds in
the basic game are fair without adjustment when probabilities are noiseless.
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Fair Odds for Noisy Probabilities Compared with 1PT :
ϵ = 0
0 0.5 1
PT0
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1
PC + m
0 0.5 1
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Odds
ϵ = 0.50
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1
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Figure VIII: To achieve fair odds for noisy probabilities, that is to say, odds
associated with zero-expectation wagers, gamblers must agree to overvalue the
longshot and undervalue the favorite. In other words, they must drive a wedge
systematically between odds associated with zero-expectation wagers and odds
consistent with the relative frequencies. The amount by which odds must
under and overvalue PT depends on the level of noise in the buyer’s and the
seller’s probabilities.
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Discussion
In the face of uncertainty, people gamble (Ramsey, 1926; Reichenbach, 1938;
Brunswik, 1943), but they also gather evidence for and against alternative hy-
potheses to improve their degrees of belief. Economists (Stigler, 1961; Arrow,
1973) have long recognized that people invest resources gathering information
while trying to manage the trade-off between decision speed and accuracy. Less
studied, however, is the fact that people display variability in the choices they
make when confronted again with the same evidence (Faisal et al., 2008).
One of the candidate theories for such choice variability involves the noisy
accumulation of evidence by competing populations of neurons for and against
alternative views about the most significant source of reward (Yang and Shadlen,
2007; Ratcliff et al., 2016; Pisauro et al., 2017; Steingroever, Helen et al., 2018).
Indeed, there is growing support for the idea that neurons in these populations
regulate their activity in striking accordance with the weight of evidence (Good,
1985; Gold and Shadlen, 2002, 2007). That is intriguing because it suggests the
brain has evolved to gather evidence in ways remarkably similar to sequential
analysis (SA), invented by Turing to help England break Enigma during World
War II, and by Wald to determine if batches of munitions were of satisfactory
quality to ship by the US Army during the same conflict.
In SA, new evidence and updated probabilities follow each other determin-
istically through Bayes’ factor in the string of samples. Moreover, different
sequences through the body of evidence ultimately lead to the same posterior
probability distribution. But in the neurophysiological counterpart, noise be-
tween the presented evidence and its internal representation by neurons arguably
makes the posterior probability distribution different from the one produced
by the precision of mathematics. While SA computes one probability for each
possible outcome, given the sampled evidence, it would appear the neurophysio-
logical counterpart produces not one probability for each possible outcome, but
an entire distribution of probabilities, given the same evidence. Accordingly,
probability itself becomes a random variable.
We examined the economic consequence of such “noisy probabilities” for
odds agreed between a buyer and a seller of binary options. Noisy, but un-
biased probabilities were predicted to compel these gamblers to drive a wedge
between the odds that are consistent with the relative frequencies of alterna-
tive outcomes, and the odds that are consistent with zero-expectation bets. In
particular, the buyer and the seller agreed to odds that were higher than the
reciprocal of their averaged unbiased beliefs when this average indicated the
outcome was more plausible than chance, while they agreed to odds that were
lower than the reciprocal of their averaged unbiased beliefs when this average
suggested the result was less likely than chance. The gamblers had to do this to
cancel an unfairness towards the seller in odds greater than two, and cancel an
inequity towards the buyer in odds smaller than two, which exist when proba-
bilities are noisy, and gamblers place equal weight on their respective beliefs.
Accordingly, our predictions suggest not only that the definition of fair odds
must account for the level of noise in the degrees of belief held by those who agree
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on odds, but also that noisy probabilities could play an essential role in creating
the long-standing empirical regularity of the favorite-longshot bias (Griffith,
1949; Shin, 1991; Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2010; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010).
Perhaps of equal interest is that our work suggests noisy probabilities make
the old-established way of revealing degrees of belief through wagering more
difficult than previously thought (Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti, 1937; Carnap, 1962;
Edwards et al., 1963), and thereby casts doubt on the promise (Arrow et al.,
2008) of betting markets to provide unbiased indicators of future events and
support rational decisions.
The Fairness of a Favourite-Longshot Bias
Since Griffith (1949) first noted the importance for psychology and eco-
nomics of understanding why betting markets tend to undervalue the favorite
and overvalue the longshot, researchers in both fields have proposed numerous
theories about why the phenomenon occurs. We can suitably categorize current
theories about the favorite-longshot bias either as conjectures about the effect
of individual cognitive bias that individuals bring to the market or as conjec-
tures about the effect of social interaction in the market. In the first category,
we find what Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) call the risk-love and misperception
of probability explanations, while in the second category we find reasons that
revolve around the presence of private information.
The risk-love explanation is the neoclassic point of view, asserting that gam-
blers are rational but have utility functions with preferences for risk (Friedman
and Savage, 1952). Accordingly, gamblers wager high volumes on the long-
shot compared to the favorite, causing odds on the longshot to drop below
the level that reflects the relative frequency of winning, while odds on the fa-
vorite move in the other direction. In contrast, the misperception of probability
explanation is the behavioral point of view, asserting that gamblers neither in-
tend to overvalue the longshot, nor undervalue the favorite, but do both due
to cognitive errors that create biased judgments. Laboratory studies showing
that people have difficulty discriminating between different magnitudes of small
probabilities support this theory and has resulted in the development of the
probability-weighting-function (Prelec, 1998), which reflects the bias observed
in markets.
Among explanations that involve private information, we find the idea (Shin,
1991) that bookmakers have customers with insider information whom they can-
not distinguish from customers with only public information. Bookmakers are,
however, assumed to know the proportion of customers with unique information,
and their optimal defense under these circumstances is to reduce odds on the
longshot and increase odds on the favorite according to the fraction of insiders
they face. Meanwhile, another theory (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2010) in this
category asserts that when collectives of people in possession of informative pri-
vate signals wager simultaneously, they will be surprised to find that although
favorites are indeed more likely to win, as their signal suggests, favorites win
even more often than what the transacted odds imply, while longshots win less
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often. In contrast, when signals are uninformative (the authors of the article
talk of noisy signals, and these must not be confused with noisy probabilities)
the favorite-longshot bias disappears, or reverses.
Our predictions link to cognitive phenomena, just like theories in the first
described category, but do not involve cognitive bias. Moreover, like Shin’s
theory in the second category, our predictions are based on adjustments to
cancel the prospect of economic inequity but do not involve unequal access to
information. Instead, we show that when gamblers accumulate evidence about
uncertain events stochastically, and when their degrees of belief consequently
couple randomly to the whole evidence, odds that reflect the relative frequencies
of outcomes are inequitable and must be adjusted to establish zero-expectation
wagers. Accordingly, we suggest the favorite-longshot bias is an essential re-
sponse by the market to create fairness among participants.
We are not suggesting the effect of noisy probabilities works alone; we ac-
knowledge that empirical studies show that gambling on the long-shot results
in worse performance than gambling on the favorite. However, this observation
does not rule out the predicted effect of noisy probabilities. Instead, it may
be that preferences for risk work together with noisy probabilities to make the
favorite-longshot bias more pronounced, creating demand and supply conditions
that move odds away from their zero-expectation levels.
The Unkept Promise of Betting Markets
An important debate among economists concerns how we should interpret
the reciprocal of odds. One argument (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006) maintains
not only that we should understand this reciprocal as the market’s degree of
belief, but also that such beliefs by markets are consistent with the mean belief
across market participants, and tends to be the best predictor of the event in
question. As such, the argument summons the rational expectations hypothesis
stated by Muth (1961), who argued that distributions of subjective probabilities
tend to scatter about the prediction of the relevant theory. On the other hand,
the counter-argument (Manski, 2006) asserts that odds reflect the mean belief of
participants only under particular circumstances, and points out that system-
atic undervaluation of favorites and overvaluation of longshots are anomalies
inconsistent with the efficiency depicted by proponents.
The debate has more than just implication for the efficient market hypothesis
because the truth of the matter affects the possibility of harnessing the wisdom
of crowds through betting to guide well-informed decisions. If skeptics are right,
the promise of betting markets to produce forecasts of outcomes with a lower
error than most conventional forecasting methods (Arrow et al., 2008), cannot
generally be kept.
Our predictions support the skeptics by suggesting that odds must systemat-
ically deviate from the mean beliefs of market participants to be fair. However,
as can readily be appreciated without much handwaving, on the general assump-
tion that beliefs closest to, but on either side of the median determine odds, the
effective value of  approaches zero as the number of gamblers increases. More-
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over, when the effective range of noisy probability thereby closes, it does so at
PT . Nevertheless, for any market of limited size, the effect is insufficient to
eradicate the bias.
The Problem of Revealing Probabilities
We must necessarily end on the most fundamental note because the pres-
ence of noisy probabilities adds some complication to the old-established way of
revealing someone’s degree of belief, which has been used regularly as a thought
experiment to explain the Bayesian position (Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti, 1937;
Edwards et al., 1963). In the classic thought-experiment (De Finetti, 1937),
someone is trying to expose the degree of belief held by someone else through
the proposal of a wager (Gilles (2000) calls them Ms. A and Mr. B respectively,
and we use those names here). In particular, Ms. A asks Mr. B to state the
odds at which he is willing to risk losing a stake that Ms. A can decide, on
the further condition that once Mr. B has revealed these odds, Ms. A is also
allowed to determine what side of the market she prefers. By applying this
scheme, Ms. A appears to create a position where she can force an honest an-
swer from Mr. B because Ms. A can punish Mr. B instantly through her choice
of role, should Mr. B be dishonest in an attempt to gain an economic advantage.
However, that appearance misleads when probabilities are noisy because under
these conditions the game punishes honesty, not dishonesty.
By allowing Ms. A to choose what side of the market she prefers after Mr.
B has set the odds, Mr. B is essentially letting Ms. A wager at odds that
place no weight on her belief, and consequently, Ms. A can at the very least
avoid expected losses and at best secure expected profits. Although our previous
story about Bob assumed equal weighting of beliefs, the optimal strategies for
Bob and Ms. A, and hence our conclusions, are the same. Mr. B must adjust
his odds downward when he believes the probability of winning is smaller than
chance and move his odds upward when he thinks the probability of victory
is higher than chance. Indeed, if he calibrates this adjustment to precision, he
should not care which side of the market Ms. A ends up choosing (see Appendix
II). Of course, the odds that Mr. B reveals to Ms. A will not reflect what he
thinks, and they will not be consistent with the relative frequencies of the given
situation. However, they will be fair.
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Appendix I
In this appendix, we derive the probability density function for PT , f(PT ),
for various odds 1PC agreed by players of the basic game when their personal
probabilities are noisy. We then use f(PT ) to derive the mean expected mar-
gin piSo of these players in their role of the seller, and find the degree m by
which PC must be adjusted to yield zero-expectation wagers. Since the favorite-
longshot bias emerges at the end of this procedure, there is reason to suspect
this long-standing empirical phenomenon involves an adjustment to establish
the foundation of an equitable market.
Given our assumptions about zero market power, risk neutrality, and unbi-
ased uniform noise , and because we assume players of the basic game place
equal weight on their respective degrees of belief, the consensus belief PC about
PT follows the triangular distribution. More specifically, PC follows the trian-
gular distribution with a lower limit given by L and an upper limit given by H
from equation (5), while its mode is given by solution (4), which makes the dis-
tribution symmetric. As a corollary of this arrangement, there is a distribution
of PT for any magnitude of PC , and our initial task is to find that distribution.
Our procedure starts with the observation that L and H are governed by
the circumference of the rhombus depicted in Figure I. In particular, the left
and top of the rhombus determine H, while L is determined by the right and
bottom. We capture this using the following equations:
left = (1 + )PT
top = (1− )PT + 
right = (1 + )PT − 
bottom = (1− )PT
H = min(left, top)
L = max(right,bottom)
Since the probability density function of a symmetric triangular distribution
is given by 
4(b−x)
(b−a)2 : a+ b < 2x ∧ b ≥ x
− 4(a−x)(b−a)2 : a ≤ x ∧ a+ b ≥ 2x
0 : Otherwise
where a is the lower limit and b is the upper limit, we substitute L = max(right,bottom)
for a and H = min(left, top) for b to find the probability density function for
PT given by equations (19) and (20) in the main text. These equations allow us
now to hold 1PC constant and investigate how PT scatters when players wager
at these odds.
Accordingly, we ask what margins players can expect at particular odds set
in accordance with solution (4) in the role of seller when PT is distributed by
f(PT ). The margin of players in the role of seller is given by equation (3)
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except we substitute PS with PT , thus changing the margin from subjective piSs
to objective piSo . The answer to our question is the expectation of piSo , but since
out main purpose is to discover the degree m by which PC must be adjusted to
result in zero-expectation wagers, we find the expectation of
piSo = (1− PT )− PT
(
1
PC +m
− 1
)
, PT ∼ f(PT ).
The mean of the seller’s expected margin p¯iSo , which the left side of Figure
VII visualizes, consists of different segments to cover the range of PC . Some of
the segments are rather lengthy, but a series of sub-expressions appear regularly
across these segments, and we can simplify things markedly by substituting these
sub-expressions for variables as done below
x1 = ln(a+ 1)
x2 = ln(1− a)
x3 = ln (1− PC)
x4 = ln
(
1
PC
)
x5 = ln
(
1
P 2C
)
x6 = ln
(
1− PC
P
)
x7 = ln
( −a− 1
−PC − 1
)
x8 = ln
(
1− PC
1− a
)
x9 = ln (PC)
x10 = ln
(
P 4C
)
x11 = ln(2)
x12 = ln ((a+ 1) (− (1− PC)))
x13 = tanh
−1 (2PC − 1)
x14 = 2x1 − x3 − x9 − 2x11 − 2
x15 = 2x3 + 2x11 + x14
x16 = −x3 − x11 − x14 − 2
x17 = x14 (PC +m) + x11
,
After performing these substitutions, the mean of the seller’s expected mar-
gin is given by the following system of piecewise equations
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p¯iSo =

((+2)x1−(−2)x2)PC+m((+1)x1−(−1)x2)
2(PC+m)
: i
(x1−x2)(PC+m−1)+(x1+x2)(2PC+m−2)
2(PC+m)
: ii
2m((+1)x1−)
2(PC+m)
: iii
2m(x3(−PC)+x9PC+x3)+2x11(2PC+m−2)−P (2x6PC−5x3+x9)−3x3+ x52
2(m+P ) : iv
PC(−2PC−3x3+3x11+1)−m(2PC+2x3−2x11+1)+3x3
PC+m
: v
m(2PC+2x4+2x11−3)+PC(2PC+3x4+3x11−3)−3x11+1
PC+m
: vi
(−x7+x17+1)+4PC(PC+m+x1−x13−1)+mx15−2x11−2x12+1
2(PC+m)
: vii
2mx16PC+x1(2m(PC+1)+PC(5−2PC))+ 12 (x10+4x11)P 2C+x16PC
2(PC+m)
: viii
(x8+x17+1)+4PC(−PC−m+x1+x13+1)+4mx1−mx15+2x8+2x11−1
2(PC+m)
: ix
where the Roman numerals denote the conditions for which the correspond-
ing piece of the overall system is relevant. These are conditions are
i to iv :

+ 1 ≥ 2PC ∧ 0 < PC ≤ 12 ∧
((
0 <  < 1
2
∧ 2PC +  ≤ 1
) ∨ ( 1
2
≤  < 1 ∧ 2PC +  < 1
))
1
2
< PC < 1 ∧ + 1 < 2PC ∧ ((2PC +  > 1 ∧  > 0) ∨ (2PC +  ≥ 1 ∧ 2 ≥ 1))
2PC = 1 ∧  < 1 ∧  > 0
+ 1 = 2PC ∧ 12 < PC < 1 ∧  < 1
 = 1 ∧ 0 < PC ≤ 12
 = 1 ∧ 2PC > 1 ∧ PC < 1
+ 1 > 2PC ∧ 2PC > 1 ∧  < 1
1
2
≤  < 1 ∧ 0 < PC < 12 ∧ 2PC +  = 1
 < 1 ∧ 2PC < 1 ∧ 2PC +  > 1
Finally, the equations for the magnitude by which PC must be adjusted to ensure
fair odds 1PC+m are found by setting each of the piecewise equations above to
zero and then solving for m. Performing these calculations yields
m =

((−2)x2−(+2)x1)PC
(+1)x1−(−1)x2 : i
((−2)x2−(+2)x1)(PC−1)
(+1)x1−(−1)x2 : ii
0 : iii
PC(−4x6PC+10x3−2x9)+8x11(PC−1)−6x3+x5
8x13PC+4x3+4x11
: iv
PC(−2PC−3x3+3x11+1)+3x3
2PC+2x3−2x11+1 : v
PC(−2PC−3x4−3x11+3)+3x11−1
2PC+2x4+2x11−3 : vi
(x7−x11−1)+(−2x1+2x13+2)PC+2x11+2x12−1
(2x1−x3−x9−2x11−2)+4PC+2x1−2x13−2 − PC : vii
PC(x1(6−4PC)+(x10+4x11)PC+2(x9+x11))
4x1(PC−1)−4(x9+x11)PC : viii
(x8+x11+1)+(2x1+2x13+2)PC+2x8+2x11−1
(−2x1+x3+x9+2x11+2)+4PC−2x1−2x13−2 − PC : ix
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Appendix II
Here we show the equations for the seller’s mean expected margin in De
Finetti’s classic thought experiment when honest probabilities are drawn from
the uniform distribution described by equation (5) in the main text. We then
show the equations for the magnitude by which PC must be adjusted to establish
odds that are fair. These adjustments resemble those required when PC is
determined by weighing PS and PB equally as in the basic game.
Once again, our initial task is to assemble distributions of PC across the
interval 0 ≤ PT ≤ 1, and slice the derived structure at the particular magnitude
of PC to find the distribution of PT at this point. However, unlike before, in
De Finetti’s thought experiment PC is derived by placing all the weight on
the subject’s honest probability, such that the distribution of PC is given by
equation (5). Nevertheless, the basic procedure resembles the one described in
Appendix I.
Accordingly, we start with the observation that L and H are governed by
the circumference of the rhombus depicted in Figure I and again arrive at the
following equations
left = (1 + )PT
top = (1− )PT + 
right = (1 + )PT − 
bottom = (1− )PT
H = min(left, top)
L = max(right,bottom)
This time, however, we must substituteH = min(left, top) and L = max(right,bottom)
into the probability density function of the uniform distribution{
1
b−a : a ≤ x ≤ b
0 : Otherwise
where a is the lower limit and b is the upper limit of the distribution. Sub-
stituting L = max(right,bottom) for a and H = min(left, top) for b yields the
probability the probability density function for PT
f(PT ) =

1
2(1−PT ) : PT −max
(
−PC
−1 ,
PC
+1
)
≥ 0 ∧ x−min
(−PC
−1 ,
PC+
+1
)
≤ 0 ∧ 2PT −  ≥ 0
1
2PT
: PT −max
(
−PC
−1 ,
PC
+1
)
≥ 0 ∧ x−min
(−PC
−1 ,
PC+
+1
)
≤ 0
0 : Otherwise.
From here, the procedure described in Appendix I can be followed exactly; we
must derive the mean of the seller’s expected margin (1− PT )−PT
(
1
PC+m
− 1
)
when PT is distributed according to f(PT ), introducing m in preparation for the
final step to by how much PC must be adjusted to establish fair odds. Again
p¯iSo consists of different segments to cover the range of PC , while a series of
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sub-expressions appear regularly across these:
x1 = x1 = ln
(
1− PC
+ 1
)
x2 = ln
(
1− P
PC
)
x3 = ln
(
PC
+ 1
)
x4 = ln
(
+ 1
PC
)
x5 = ln(2)
x6 = tanh
−1()
x7 = −x1 − x3 − 2x5
x8 = 4x5 − 4x4
After performing the required substitutions, the mean of the seller’s expected
margin is given by the following system of piecewise equations
p¯iSo =

PC
(2−1)
(m+PC)
+ x6 : i
PC−1
2−1 +
x6(m+PC−1)

m+PC
: ii
2PCx2(−m−PC+1)+2PC−1
4PC(m+PC)
: iii
(+1)x7(m+PC)+(+1)x1+(+1)x5+2PC−1
2(+1)(m+PC)
: iv
−+(PC−1)x8(m+PC)+2PC−1
4(+1)(m+PC)
: v
0 : Otherwise
where the Roman numerals again denote the conditions for which the corre-
sponding piece of the overall equation is relevant. These are
i to v :

+ 1 ≥ 2PC ∧
((
0 <  < 1
3
∧ (2PC +  = 1 ∨ (PC > 0 ∧ 2PC +  ≤ 1))
) ∨ (PC > 0 ∧ 3 ≥ 1 ∧ 2PC +  < 1))
+ 1 < 2PC ∧ PC < 1 ∧ ((2PC +  > 1 ∧  > 0) ∨ (2PC +  ≥ 1 ∧ 3 ≥ 1))
2PC +  > 1 ∧  < 1 ∧ + 1 = 2PC
 < 1 ∧ + 1 > 2PC ∧ 2PC +  > 1
1
3
≤  < 1 ∧ + 1 > 2PC ∧ 2PC +  = 1
The equations for the magnitude by which PC must be adjusted to ensure
fair odds 1PC+m are now found by setting each of the above piecewise equations
to zero and solving for m. This gives
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Noisy Probabilities in De Finetti’s Thought Experiment:
0.5 1
PC
-0.25
0
0.1
 So
ϵ = 0.5
1
PC
-0.1
0
0.1
m
ϵ = 0.5
Figure IX: The subject’s mean expected margin in the role of seller in De
Finetti’s classic thought experiment when m = 0. Left: The adjustments to
PC needed to establish fair odds. The shown pattern is clearly comparable to
the one reported in Figure VII of the main text.
m =

PC((2−1)x6+)
(1−2)x6 : i
(PC−1)((2−1)x6+)
(1−2)x6 : ii
2PC−1
2PCx2
− PC + 1 : iii
−PC((+1)x7+2)+(+1)x1+(+1)x5−1(+1)x7 : iv
−2PC+1
(PC−1)x8 − PC : v
0 : Otherwise
As Figure IX illustrates, the adjustments of PC needed to establish fair odds
in De Finetti’s thought experiment resemble those reported in the main text.
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